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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE CITY OF SALT LAKE, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JONATHAN LAMAR ARCHIBALD, : Case No. 20001079-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
SUMMARY 
On appeal Mr. Archibald is challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. Mr. Archibald maintains that the trial court erred in determining that he was 
not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
In response to Mr. Archibald's arguments on appeal, the City claims that Mr. 
Archibald was not seized because he chose to open the door to his motel room and the 
officers used no force to compel him to do so. Essentially, the City claims that because 
Mr. Archibald could have ignored the constant knocking by the officers, he was not 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE CITY'S ARGUMENT THAT MR. ARCHIBALD WAS NOT SEIZED 
IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IGNORES THE 
UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ENCOUNTER 
BETWEEN MR. ARCHIBALD AND THE POLICE OFFICERS 
A. Mr. Archibald Was Seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three levels of police encounters with the 
public which are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize 
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion11 that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 
736 F.2d 223,230 (5th Cir.1984) (citation omitted)). 
The hallmark of a level I voluntary police-citizen encounter is the right of a citizen 
to decline answering an officer's inquiries simply by walking away. Salt Lake City v. 
Rav. 998 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 
1994); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990). Most level I encounters 
occur when a citizen in a public place is approached by police officers. See, e.g., Ray, 
998 P.2d at 274 (in front of a convenience store); Deitman. 739 P.2d at 616 (on public 
sidewalk/street); State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991) (on the side of a public 
road). A level I encounter may escalate into a level II encounter when, viewing the 
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totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or she is not free 
to leave. State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 , 1227-28 (Utah App. 1997); Jackson. 805 P.2d 
at 767. A reasonable person would not feel free to leave when an officer, by show of 
physical force or authority, restrains that person's liberty. Ray. 998 P.2d at 277; Bean. 
869 P.2d at 986. The subjective intent of an officer is irrelevant to the determination of 
whether a Fourth Amendment seizure or violation has occurred. See Maryland v. Macon. 
472 U.S. 463,470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778,2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) ("Whether a 
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time' and 
not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." 
(citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128, 136, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 
1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)). 
The City argues that because Mr. Archibald could have declined to look out the 
window when he heard the knocks on the door to his motel room and because he could 
have refused to answer the officers' persistent knocking at his door, Mr. Archibald was 
not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Essentially, the City argues that Mr. 
Archibald "chose" to have an encounter with the police officers when he responded to the 
officers' knocking and thus, there was not a sufficient show of authority by the officers to 
convert the voluntary encounter into a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion. The City's 
arguments will be addressed below in relation to three relevant factors: the time of the 
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encounter, the location of the encounter and the length of time the officers knocked on 
Mr. Archibald's door. 
i. Time of the Encounter 
First, the City asserts that because Mr. Archibald did not cite to code sections §§ 
77-7-5(2) (1999) and 77-23-205(1) (1999) now referenced on appeal, this Court should 
disregard them. However, the City fails to acknowledge the difference between 
arguments not raised below and authority not asserted below. Mr. Archibald argued in 
the trial court that the time the officers knocked on his door contributed to the 
unreasonableness of his encounter with the officers. (R. 16-25.) Mr. Archibald's citation 
to statutory authority on appeal to support his argument is wholly permissible as it serves 
only to bolster previously raised arguments. Thus, the City's request of this Court to 
disregard supporting authority is not well taken. 
The City attempts to characterize Mr. Archibald's argument as one seeking to limit 
police work in the community to specified hours. This is an incorrect summary of Mr. 
Archibald's assertions. The essence of Mr. Archibald's argument with respect to the time 
of the encounter has always been, and continues to be, that the unreasonable time of the 
encounter is but one factor contributing to the conclusion that Mr. Archibald was seized 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. There is a distinct difference in reasonableness 
between a citizen or police officer knocking on one's door at nighttime rather than 
daytime, a difference between a knock on one's door at midnight rather than noon. If 
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there were no distinction, then officers would not need special judicial authorization and 
justification in order to execute a search warrant at night. See Utah Code Ann. 77-23-
205(1) (1999). Implicit in the requirement of additional justification for the nighttime 
execution of a search warrant is the assumption that the daytime execution of a search 
warrant is more reasonable than the nighttime execution of such a warrant, based solely 
on the time of execution. 
By analogy, it is more reasonable to expect an unsolicited knock at one's front 
door during the daytime hours than during the nighttime hours. The officers first knocked 
on Mr. Archibald's motel room door at 10:47 p.m., a nighttime hour pursuant to sections 
77-23-205(1) and 77-7-5(2) of the Utah Code. The officers' incessant knocking at Mr. 
Archibald's door was not preceded by any attempt to investigate the anonymous tip 
which led the officers to Mr. Archibald's room to begin with, namely that there were drug 
and solicitation activities going on in Mr. Archibald's motel room. The officers did not 
bother to conduct surveillance but simply proceeded directly to Mr. Archibald's room at 
nearly 11 p.m. and began pounding on the motel room door. Any reasonable person 
would consider a knock on one's door for any reason at such a late hour inappropriate, 
absent an emergency. 
Mr. Archibald does not seek to establish a bright-line rule prohibiting police 
contact with citizens at their homes at particular times; rather, Mr. Archibald simply 
argues that the unreasonableness of the time of the encounter contributes to the 
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conclusion that Mr. Archibald was seized. A legally recognized difference has been 
established between daytime and nighttime. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-205(1) 
and 77-7-5(2) (1999). Implicit in that clear legal distinction is a recognized difference 
between the reasonableness of encounters during the daytime versus the nighttime, 
particularly at one's front door. Thus, the time of the officers' knocking contributes to 
the conclusion that Mr. Archibald was seized. 
ii Location of the Encounter 
The City claims that because Mr. Archibald was at his residence, he should have 
felt more empowered to decline the officers' knocks at his door. "If a citizen is going to 
feel he has any alternative options, it is at his residence - as opposed to being stopped on 
a public street. If citizens' homes are their castles, then citizens are going to feel more 
empowered at home than if engaged on a sidewalk or street." (Appellee's Brief at 14.) 
The City's claim is contrary to the basis tenets of the Fourth Amendment. 
A warrantless search of a residence is constitutionally permissible 
where probable cause and exigent circumstances are proven. "Warrantless 
entries are justified with probable cause and exigent circumstances because 
in such circumstances, the delay to obtain a search warrant would risk 
'physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant 
evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect.'" However, when a private 
residence is involved, the State's burden in proving probable cause and 
exigent circumstances is " 'particularly heavy.'" This elevated burden is a 
result of the "heightened expectation of privacy" that citizens enjoy in 
their own homes. 
State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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In terms of Fourth Amendment protections, the home is sacrosanct and entitled to 
the highest level of protection from unwarranted intrusions. To argue that because an 
officer approaches an individual at his or her residence, that individual should somehow 
feel "empowered" to decline to speak with persistently knocking officers defies reason. It 
is precisely because the home enjoys such an elevated status under the Fourth 
Amendment that police encounters with citizens at their homes are objectively more 
intrusive and coercive. 
The City argues there is a difference between a person approached by officers in a 
dead-end alley and the officers' approach of Mr. Archibald at his motel room. To the 
contrary, Mr. Archibald's confinement in his motel room is nearly identical to the 
situation faced by a person cornered by police officers in a dead-end alley. The City 
asserts that Mr. Archibald had the option of retreating into his room rather than answering 
the knocks at his door, whereas a person cornered in a dead-end alley has no option but to 
remain in the presence of the officers or move past the officers to continue on his or her 
way. 
The City's analysis is flawed. Mr. Archibald had the same choices available to 
him as would a person cornered by police officers in a dead-end alley. When Mr. 
Archibald initially heard knocking at his door, he went to window and looked outside. 
When Mr. Archibald observed two uniformed, armed police officers, he retreated into his 
room without answering the door. Not content with Mr. Archibald's apparent 
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unwillingness to respond to their knocks, the officers continued knocking on Mr. 
Archibald's door for 45 seconds straight after seeing that Mr. Archibald was inside the 
room. Mr. Archibald was faced with a Hobson's choice: remain in the presence of the 
officers knocking at his door by staying in his motel room or remain in the presence of 
the officers by attempting to leave his room, thereby placing himself in the direct path of 
the officers. The City seems to suggest that Mr. Archibald should be required to leave 
the safety, privacy and comfort of his residence to avoid the officers' incessant knocking. 
If indeed a person's home is his or her castle, police officers should not be entitled to 
constructively evict a person, even temporarily, from his or her home. 
The City argues this case involves ffmere interaction" between Mr. Archibald and 
the police officers, dealing neither with restraint by physical force nor constructive 
restraint by show of authority. (Appellee's Brief at 12-13.) To support its position, the 
City argues that Mr. Archibald's "first option was to decide whether or not to even look 
out the window. In one's abode at 10:47 PM one need not even look out the window 
upon hearing a knock at the door." (Appellee's Brief at 13.) 
The City's argument is inventive at best, given that any reasonable person who 
heard an unexpected knock on their door at nearly 11:00 p.m. would investigate to see 
who the late-night visitor was. The City further argues that Mr. Archibald simply could 
have ignored the police officers' knocking on his door, retreated into his residence or 
simply left the residence by walking out the same door where the officers stood knocking. 
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Most compelling is the fact that initially, Mr. Archibald did exactly what the City 
suggests: he ignored the police officers' knocking on his door and retreated into his motel 
room. That attempt was consciously disregarded by the officers and was met by more 
persistent knocking. Mr. Archibald heard the knocking on his door and looked out a 
curtained window to ascertain the identity of the visitors. Mr. Archibald observed two 
armed, uniformed police officers and retreated from the window back into his room. Mr. 
Archibald did not answer the door, yell or give any other indication to the officers that he 
intended to exit the room or otherwise comply with their request to come to the door. 
Upon seeing a face in the curtained window of the room, the officers continued 
knocking for 45 seconds straight, until Mr. Archibald relented and answered the door. 
The City seems to argue that Mr. Archibald is somehow responsible for the officers' 
persistent knocking. The City states: "It is entirely reasonable to assume that had the 
defendant not disclosed his presence - and the fact that he was awake - the officers 
would have gone on their way." (Appellee's brief at 18.) There is nothing in the record 
to support this assertion. 
The City urges this Court to consider Mr. Archibald's "voluntary" conduct. 
Particularly, the City argues that Mr. Archibald "chose to engage the officers by opening 
the door." (Appellee's Brief at 19.) The City supports its argument with State v. 
Jackson. 805 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1990) and Lavton Citv v. Bennett. 741 P.2d 965 (Utah 
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App. 1987), ostensibly bolstering the proposition that voluntary conduct by a defendant in 
initiating contact with police officers negates a claim of an unlawful seizure. The City's 
reliance on these cases ignores fundamental factual differences between those cases and 
the facts currently before this Court. 
In Jackson, the defendant was followed by a police officer into the parking lot of a 
bar. However, the officer did not activate his overheard lights or siren or otherwise 
attempt to effectuate a level II stop. Instead, the officer simply pulled his vehicle into the 
parking lot behind the defendant's car and as the officer's car was still moving, the 
defendant approached the officer. 805 P.2d at 766-67. The Court noted that although the 
police officers' car blocked the defendant's car, the act of blocking did not start until the 
defendant had initiated contact with the police officer. IdL That is, the officer had 
engaged in no conduct reflective of an attempt to make contact with the defendant. Id. 
In Bennett, an officer followed the defendant as the defendant parked his truck at a 
construction site. 741 P.2d at 967. Although the officer had not activated his lights or 
sirens, or otherwise conveyed to the defendant a desire to speak with him, the defendant 
approached the officer and initiated a conversation with the officer. Id. This Court 
concluded that such an encounter was consensual and voluntary. 
Bennett and Jackson are distinguishable from the instant matter. In both Bennett 
and Jackson, the defendants initiated conversations with police officers by approaching 
the officers without any prompting by the officer. In the instant matter, however, the only 
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reason Mr. Archibald interacted with the officers ab initio was because the officers 
persistently banged at his door, prompting him to answer due to the length of the 
knocking. It is clear the officers initiated contact with Mr. Archibald, supporting Mr. 
Archibald's assertion that the encounter between himself and the officers was a seizure 
requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause, entirely absent in this case. 
iii Length of Knocking 
The City argues that once the officers observed the occupant of the motel room 
was awake and present in the room but declining to answer, it was reasonable to "expect 
that the person at the door [would] knock again." (Appellee's Brief at 21.) To the 
contrary, once Mr. Archibald saw that there were two armed, uniformed police officers 
knocking on his door at a late hour and he refused to answer their initial knocks, it was 
unreasonable for the officers to continue knocking for 45 additional seconds when it was 
abundantly clear Mr. Archibald had heard the knocks and did not wish to speak with the 
officers. 
By declining to respond to the officers' first knocks, upon seeing the officers 
standing outside his door, Mr. Archibald implicitly rejected the officers' invitation to 
come to the front door. Thereafter, the officers' decision to knock for an additional 
period of time after seeing Mr. Archibald move away from the curtained window of his 
motel room, left Mr. Archibald with no other option but to respond to knocking. There is 
no indication in the record that the officers intended to cease their attempts to contact Mr. 
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Archibald, regardless of his actions. The fact that the officers continued to knock after 
seeing Mr. Archibald look out the window, despite the failure of Mr. Archibald to 
voluntarily go to the fact door at that point, demonstrates that the officers were not going 
to take no for an answer. Under these circumstances, the length of knocking strongly 
corroborates Mr. Archibald's assertion that he was seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, Mr. Archibald was seized 
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause in violation the Fourth Amendment. 
Accordingly, we respectfully request that this Court reverse the district court's decision 
denying Mr. Archibald's motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings, if any. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this %<±_ day of May, 2001. 
ROMERO 
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